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Whether you voted for me, or voted for Barack, the time is now to unite as
a single party with a single purpose. We are on the same team, and none
of us can sit on the sidelines. This is a fight for the future. And it’s a fight
we must win.
Hillary Rodham Clinton (2008)

The above words, spoken by Hillary Clinton on stage at the Democratic National
Convention, aimed to fulfill the fundamental task faced by the Democratic Party in the
2008 election: to unite the party in the wake of an historic, yet divisive, nomination
battle. The candidacies of Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama represented the
first time that either a woman and or an African American, respectively, had come within
striking distance of the presidential nomination of a major political party in the United
States. Obama won a close, but decisive, victory, with approximately 2,158.5 delegates
to approximately 1,920 delegates for Clinton (New York Times 2008). As the
acrimonious battle for the nomination dragged on past Super Tuesday and into the spring,
however, the emergence of hard feelings between the competing camps led to worries
that the party might not be able to reconcile its differences during the general election
campaign (Jacoby and Farnam 2008). If the party were to split into enduring factions led
by its two largest constituencies – African Americans and women – overcoming
collective action problems in future elections could prove to be especially difficult (Reiter
1980, 2004). A key question for Democrats, then, was how to heal the rift in the party?
What factors would bring Clinton supporters into the Obama fold? What would allow
Obama supporters to accept Clinton supporters’ role within the party?
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Social networks help to resolve conflicts, build trust, and establish social capital
(Kwak, Shah, and Holbert 2004; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Putnam 2000; Siegel 2009).
Networks are a critical part of a political party’s structure that creates informal linkages
between elements of its decentralized organization (Grossman and Dominguez 2009;
Koger, Masket and Noel 2009; Heaney and Rojas 2007; Monroe 2001; Schwartz 1990).
If networks are imbued with the capacity for conflict resolution, then parties should be
able to draw upon networks in addressing internal factional disputes. Is it possible that
networks could serve as mechanism to unite the warring factions of the Democratic
Party?
Just as networks contain the elements needed to resolve conflicts, they have the
potential to solidify cliques and exacerbate factionalism. If networks are drawn within a
relatively close cluster of people, they may promote inter-group rivalry and conflict
(Crossley 2008). Third-person connections in networks have the potential to stimulate
the exchange of angry words, foster distrust, and lead to character assassination (Burt
2005). When individuals become overembedded in networks, the marginal effect of
networks may prove negative, serving to crowd out information and limit contacts rather
than expanding them (Hagedoorn and Frankort 2008; Uzzi 1997). Is it possible that this
so-called “dark side” of networks may serve to perpetuate the rift within the party instead
of healing it?
This research investigates the effects of social networks on the intra-party conflict
within the Democratic Party in 2008. Drawing upon a sample of 449 pledged delegates
at the 2008 Democratic National Convention (227 Obama delegates and 222 Clinton
delegates), we ask two questions. First, under what conditions were Clinton delegates
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satisfied with Obama and did they plan to give him their active support? Second, under
what conditions did Obama delegates recognize and accept the role of Clinton delegates
at the convention? In addressing these questions, we consider the role social networks,
experience with party institutions, views on intra-party democracy, and the effect of
Hillary Clinton’s speech endorsing Obama. We control for demographic factors
including race, sex, sexual identity, age, ideology, education, income, union membership,
and religiosity.
This paper proceeds in five parts. First, we discuss the problem of divisive
nomination contests and their implications for candidates in the general election. Second,
we consider the alternative possibilities for social networks as sources of unity and
division. Third, we outline the steps taken to collect and analyze data from delegates at
the 2008 Democratic National Convention. Fourth, we present the results of our data
analysis, including estimates of ordered probit and tobit regressions. We conclude by
considering the implications of our findings for social netwoks and the study of political
parties.

Divisive Nominations and the General Election
The contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton was the most recent in a
long history of bitterly fought nomination campaigns. In 1968, the Democratic Party
found itself immersed in crisis as it attempted to choose between Vice President Hubert
Humphrey and Senator Eugene McCarthy in the midst of the Vietnam War, President
Johnson’s withdrawal from the race, and the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.
In 1976, the Republicans suffered a crisis of confidence after Watergate, as they chose
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between sitting President Gerald Ford and former California Governor Ronald Reagan.
In 1980, the Democrats were again weakened by international conflict – this time in Iran
– leading to a hard-fought battle between sitting President Jimmy Carter and
Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy. Just four years later, the Democratic Party’s
national convention was again marred by factionalism when a prolonged campaign by
Colorado Senator Gary Hart threatened to derail the presumed nomination of former Vice
President Walter Mondale. In each of these instances, a divisive nomination contest
preceded a loss by the party in the general election.
The divisive nomination hypothesis, first advanced by Key (1958), maintains that
a party achieves less success in a general election campaign if it has experienced a
divisive campaign for the nomination. Herrera (1993, p. 76) explains that divisiveness
makes it harder for a party to present “programmatically clear alternatives” to voters.
Lengle, Owen, and Sooner (1995) demonstrate that divisiveness is more of a problem for
the Democratic Party than for the Republicans, due to the party’s pluralistic base, crosscutting factions, and comparatively heterogeneous ideological makeup. Their analysis of
state-level elections from 1932 to 1992 shows that “Democrats lose 88% of divisive
primary states, but win 69% of the nondivisive primary and 74% of caucus states”
(Lengle et al., 1995, pp. 378-379, emphasis in original).
Part of the reason why divided nominations hurt the party may be a negative
“carryover effect” from primaries and caucuses to the general election (Buell 1986; Stone
1984, 1986). Activists who supported a losing candidate are less likely to devote their
energies to the victory of the party’s nominee in the fall. When nomination contests
persist for a long time, as was true for the Obama-Clinton match-up, “the psychological
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investment each delegate has in his/her candidate” increases, making it “more difficult
for losers to accept the convention outcome and recommit their energies to the winner”
(Sullivan 1977-1978, p. 637; see also Kenney and Rice 1987). Offering the vice
presidency to the second-place candidate may be a way of assuaging her or his supporters
and trying to mobilize them in the general election. The fact that Obama did not offer the
vice presidency to Clinton, however, foreclosed one path toward factional healing in
2008.
Divisive nomination campaigns do not occur randomly. Campaigns may be
divisive because the nominee is weak, which is potentially the ultimate source of
demobilization and loss in the general election (Atkeson 1998; Stone, Atkeson, and
Rapoport 1992). Thus, even if divisiveness does not directly undermine a party’s
chances, it may do so indirectly by signaling to relevant observers – the media, the other
party, and voters – that a candidate is vulnerable to challenge. A contest of symbolic
interpretation naturally ensues (Edelman 1988). If Obama is such a strong presidential
candidate, then why did he lose to Clinton in West Virginia, Kentucky, and South
Dakota, even after he clinched the nomination? Perhaps there are lingering doubts about
Obama’s leadership? His experience? Or, perhaps, this is strictly a case of two
phenomenal candidates competing head to head. The truth is a matter of spin.
Regardless of whether the source of divisiveness is a weak frontrunner or two
strong, equally-matched contenders, it is in the interests of the party to heal the rift in the
party and bring the contending factions together for a common purpose. Party unity
facilitates the efficient allocation of party resources (material and immaterial) and avoids
distracting media attention. Obama and the Democrats ultimately won the 2008 election.
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However, it is easy to see how they might not have. If a foreign policy crisis, rather than
an economic crisis, had surfaced in September 2008, McCain might have gained a
valence advantage over Obama in the presidential debates. If Republican vice
presidential nominee Sarah Palin had succeeded in reaching out to women on a bipartisan
basis, then she might have been able to attract some of Clinton’s supporters to the
Republican ticket. Under these conditions, the 2008 election might have been as close at
the 2000 and 2004 elections, leaving the Democrats searching for all the unity they could
find. In the following section, we weigh whether social networks were likely to be a
source of that unity, or a source of further division.

Social Networks, Unity, and Division
American political parties are neither hierarchical nor centrally organized.
Rather, as Sorauf (1968, pp. 11-12) explains, American party structures are “mixed,
varied, and even contradictory” and operate according to the principles of an “open,
inclusive, semi-public political organization.” These qualities lead parties to adopt
networks as a convenient mode of organization (Monroe 2001; Schwartz 1990).
Networks allow members of a party to work together informally across institutional
boundaries on an event-by-event basis. These networks consist of elected officials, party
staff members, campaign consultants, volunteers, convention delegates, representatives of
interest groups, 527 organizations, major donors, and others who have a stake in the
party’s success.
Working though networks affords a wide range of advantages to members of a
party. Networks ease the flow of timely, sensitive information (Coleman, Katz and
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Menzel 1957). They foster the development of trust and speed problem solving (Burt and
Knez 1995; Weller, McCubbins and Paturi 2009). Networks are at the heart of social
capital formation and conflict resolution (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert 2004; Lake and
Huckfeldt 1998; Putnam 2000; Sandefur and Laumann 1998; Siegel 2009). Consistent
with this line of research, Koger, Masket and Noel (2009) find that networks facilitate
cooperation among competing party factions, both within the Democratic and Republican
parties.
Previous research has not specifically examined the negative effects of networks
within parties. However, it is reasonable to expect that some of the negative effects of
networks found within social and business settings – such as rivalry promotion, character
assassination, and overembeddedness – may be present within political parties (Burt
2005; Crossley 2008; Hagedoorn and Frankort 2008; Uzzi 1997). For example,
overembeddedness occurs when an individual is overburdened with redundant network
ties, which are costly to maintain, but rarely furnish timely, new information. Along
these lines, if party leaders build networks that are too insular, they may inadvertently
exclude themselves from relevant information about changing political phenomena, such
as shifting alliances at the grassroots. Or, clique formation within parties may solidify
the presence of factions that undercut a party’s appeal to undecided voters, as was
generated by Pat Robertson’s campaign for president in 1988 (Pastor, Stone and
Rapoport 1999). Finally, a party’s network structure may align with ideological
cleavages in such a way as to make it vulnerable to major shifts in political alignments, as
was the case for the Whig Party in the 1840s and 1850s (Reiter 1996).
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The effects of networks on political behavior can be understood both at the
network level and at individual level. At the network level, the key question is where is
the individual positioned relative to the whole network? Centrality – or the individual’s
proximity to the center of the network – is a frequent way of characterizing this position
(Bonacich 1987; Freeman 1979). Individuals closer to the center of the network are
influenced more acutely by network – whether the effect is positive or negative –
because, in comparison with less central actors, they can more easily reach other actors in
the network, they receive information through the network at a lower cost, and they are
more closely embedded with the actions of others in the network. Two competing
hypotheses can be stated at the network level:
H1:

Social Capital Hypothesis. As an individual approaches the center of the party
network, she or he gains social capital that promotes conflict resolution within the
network.

H2:

Overembeddedness Hypothesis. As an individual approaches the center of the
party network, she or he becomes restricted by network position in a way that
undermines conflict resolution within the network.
At the individual level, the key question is, what is the nature of the direct

contacts the individual has with others (usually referred to as the “ego network”)? The
degree of homophily (networks with similar alters) or heterophily (networks with
dissimilar alters) is a common way of conceptualizing these contacts. Networks often
tend strongly toward homophily, leading networks to reinforce, rather than contradict,
individual predispositions (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Mutz 2002).
Heterophilous networks help to soften disagreements, familiarize participants with
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rationales for positions other than their own, and encourage individuals to search for
compromise positions (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2006; Mutz and
Mondak 2006). Two competing hypotheses can be stated at the individual level:
H3:

Social Capital Hypothesis. The degree of homophily or heterophily in an
individual’s network does not alter the capacity of social ties to promote conflict
resolution. Network ties have a uniform, positive effect on the individual.

H4:

Cross-Cutting Networks Hypothesis. As an individual’s networks become more
heterophilous, she or he becomes more likely to resolve conflicts within a
network. As an individual’s networks become more homophilous, she or he
becomes less likely to resolve conflicts within a network.
These hypotheses are not intended to be universal. Indeed, it is possible that in

some places and contexts, party networks serve to enhance social capital, while in other
contexts they suffer from overembeddedness or the composition of contacts in ego
networks. In the following section, we outline how these hypotheses are tested using
data collected at the 2008 Democratic National Convention.

Surveys at the 2008 Democratic National Convention
Presidential nominating conventions no longer function as mechanisms to select a
nominee, who is known in advance of the convention, but largely as a television
showcase for the party (Pangaopoulos 2007). Nonetheless, conventions still serve as the
largest arena in which the party can gather – from the highest elected officials to midlevel grassroots volunteers (Shafer 2009). They are unique opportunities for party
activists to network and talk about the future of the party.
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Surveying delegates at the Democratic National Convention allowed us to solicit
their viewpoints at a vital time of transition for the party. The grueling primary and
caucus season had only recently concluded, with Obama’s victory and Clinton’s
concession fresh in mind. The fall campaign had not yet launched. The Republicans had
not held their convention and the world had not been introduced to Sarah Palin.
Surveying delegates earlier would have been impossible, as they had only recently been
selected. Surveying delegates later would have been tainted by the influence of the fall
campaign.
We assembled a team of 19 surveyors to administer pencil-and-paper surveys of
participants at the convention. 1 While a purely random and representative sample of
participants at such an event is impossible, we took aggressive steps to approximate
randomness, consistent with similar studies undertaken in recent years (cf. Fisher,
Stanley, Berman, and Neff 2005; Goss 2006; Heaney and Rojas 2007). We distributed
the team proportionately across places at which delegates were expected to gather,
including the lobbies of official convention hotels, the Colorado Convention Center
(where caucus meetings were held), and the Pepsi Center (the main convention hall).
The surveyors were instructed to approach persons wearing convention credentials and
invite them to participate in a 15-minute survey of the participants at the convention. A
total of 534 people agreed to take the survey, giving us a response rate of 72 percent.
Pledged delegates made up 84 percent of the sample (449 pledged delegates; 227 for
Obama; 222 for Clinton), with the remaining group including uncommitted
superdelegates and other party activists.
1

The team consisted of 16 graduate and undergraduate students from local universities, plus three
of the principal investigators on the study.
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The survey was six pages in length and included 47 questions that covered
respondents’ political backgrounds, attitudes, and demographic information. 2 It provided
data on three dependent variables. First, it asked, “How satisfied are you with Barack
Obama as the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party?”, with potential answers
ranging from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied” on a five-point Likert scale (with five
indicating “very satisfied”). When asked of Clinton delegates, answers to this question
indicate the degree to which delegates have made their peace with Obama’s candidacy.
Second, the survey asked a battery of questions on likelihood that delegates would make
concrete contributions to the Obama campaign, including volunteering time, giving
money, helping to raise money, and trying to persuade others to vote for Obama, with
potential answers ranging from “extremely likely” to “not at all likely” on a five-point
Likert scale (with five indicating “extremely likely”). When asked of Clinton delegates,
this question assesses the potential carryover effect into the general election. Third, the
survey asked, “What do you think about the role played by Hillary Clinton’s supporters
during this convention?”, with potential answers ranging from “too much of a role” to
“not played enough of a role” on a three-point scale (with three indicating “not played
enough of a role”). When asked of Obama delegates, this question measures the extent to
which delegates are prepared to embrace Clinton delegates as part of the party faithful.
The survey assessed delegates’ networks using two measures. First, it asked them
whether they were participating in any caucuses at the convention and, if so, to name the
caucuses. The caucus meeting structure is a distinctive feature of the Democratic
Convention (Freeman 1986). Thirteen caucuses (including the Black Caucus, the
Women’s Caucus, and the Disability Caucus) are organized officially, while a number of
2

A list of all questions used in this paper is provided in Appendix A.
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other caucuses (such as the Labor Caucus, the Health Care Caucus, and the Education
Caucus) are organized unofficially. Almost any group can organize and meet in
conjunction with the convention, as long as it is not perceived as openly hostile to the
party or its nominee. These meetings prove to be essential to networking across the
constituency groups most important to the Democrats. We use the overlapping
memberships of individuals in caucuses to measure delegate-level position relative to the
overall party network. 3
The second network-oriented question assessed the composition of the
respondent’s ego network. It asked, “How would you describe the political preferences
of your close friends during the primaries and caucuses?”, with options ranging from
“Almost all of my close friends supported Obama” to “Almost all of my close friends
supported candidates other than Obama” on a five-point Likert scale (with five indicating
friends’ universal support for Obama). For Clinton delegates, a high score on this
question reflects heterophilous networks, while a lower score reflects more homophilous
networks. For Obama delegates, a high score on this question reflects homophilous
networks, while a lower score reflects heterophilous networks.
The survey gathered data on several other indicators of respondents’ political
backgrounds, attitudes, and social-economic status. First, experience with party
institutions, which encourages delegates to place their loyalty with party unity rather than
a specific candidate’s aspirations (Stone 1984, 1986), is indicated by questions about
membership on party committees (such as the platform committee); having served as an
officer in national, state, or local party organizations; history of attending past
3

The two-mode individual-caucus network is converted to a one-mode network of individuals
(Breiger 1974). After constructing the one-mode network, centrality is computed using the eigenvector
method proposed by Bonacich (1987).
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conventions; and plans for attending meetings at the 2008 convention. Second, the belief
in intra-party democracy, which suggests an amateur rather than professional orientation
to party politics (Soule and Clarke 1970; Wilson 1962), is measured with a question
about majority rule. It asks, “In your opinion, should all decisions at the convention be
determined by a simple majority of delegates, or should losing candidates’ supporters be
given special consideration?” Third, we assessed the effect of Clinton’s endorsement of
Obama using date the survey was administered, creating a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if it was given after her speech. Finally, the survey included a series of
standard questions on race, sex, sexual identity, age, ideology, education, income, union
status, and religiosity.

Statistical Results
Obama and Clinton Delegates Compared. The survey yielded significantly
different results for Obama and Clinton delegates. Descriptive statistics by candidate
pledged and difference-of-means tests are reported in Table 1. Obama delegates espouse
significantly higher satisfaction with and support for Obama, and think less of a role
played by Clinton delegates, than do Clinton delegates. Obama delegates are more likely
to have close friends who support Obama, and to support majority rule within the
convention, than do Clinton delegates. Obama delegates are more likely to be African
American, and less likely to be women or from union households, than are Clinton
delegates.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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The stark differences in attitudes toward Obama and Clinton can be understood
more clearly by graphing their distributions. Figure 1 compares differences between
Obama and Clinton delegates in satisfaction with Obama. Most Obama delegates report
that they are “very satisfied” with him as the nominee, with a few reporting that they are
“somewhat satisfied.” In contrast, Clinton delegates express a wider range of satisfaction
levels. While most claim that they are very or somewhat satisfied, a fair number of
responses range from indifferent to “very unsatisfied.” A similar pattern is observed in
Figure 2, which presents differences in levels of support for Obama. The support
measure is tabulated by adding the Likert scores on each of four questions (volunteerism,
giving money, raising money, and persuading others) that refer to activities that would
enhance the fall campaign. 4 While many of Clinton’s delegates plan to be supportive of
Obama, a nontrivial percentage displays a marked lack of enthusiasm, if not outright
hostility, to the nominee.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
Capturing the attitudes of Obama delegates toward Clinton is not as
straightforward as documenting the views of Clinton delegates toward Obama. Since
Clinton was not the nominee, it would not have made sense to ask delegates about their
satisfaction with her or their plans to support her. Instead, we opted to inquire about the
role of Clinton’s delegates. Were they appropriate players at the convention? Were they
overreaching? Should they be more involved? The results, reported in Figure 3, show
that most respondents thought that Clinton delegates operated appropriately at the
convention. Obama delegates, however, are more likely to report that they play too much

4

Four points are subtracted from each score in order to normalize support on the [0,16] interval,
rather than the [4, 20] interval created by simple addition.
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of a role, while Clinton delegates are more likely to report that they play not enough of a
role.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
These results collectively suggest that the Democrats faced a rift in the party at
the time of the Democratic National Convention. Yes, many supporters of each
candidate were ready to recognize and respect the other candidate. But there was still
much work to be done. If a sizeable portion of Clinton delegates – and activists like them
– rejected Obama, this could have spelled trouble for the fall election. If Obama
supporters pushed Clinton people away from the party, then the Democrats would only be
weaker for it.
Mapping the Party Network. Differences between Obama and Clinton supporters
can also be appreciated by visualizing the party network. A representation of the twomode individual-caucus network is presented in Figure 4. In this network, green circles
represent Obama delegates, yellow circles represent Clinton delegates, and blue circles
represent unpledged delegates.5 Black squares (labeled) stand for official caucuses and
black triangles (unlabeled) stand for unofficial caucuses. A line from a circle to a square
or a triangle implies that an individual is a member of that caucus. The position of nodes
in the network is determined using the Kamada and Kawai (1989) spring-embedding
algorithm. This algorithm positions the nodes so as to minimize the “energy” in the
system caused by connecting the nodes to one another.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

5

Centrality estimates are computed using observations both from pledged delegates and other
respondents to the survey. The regression analyses below, however, dawn individual observations only
from the set of pledged delegates.
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The graph in Figure 4 clearly identifies both insiders and outsiders within the
party network. Some delegates are positioned toward the center of the network, between
several of the official caucuses. Other delegates are confined to the periphery, isolated in
their connections with marginal caucuses. Variations between Obama and Clinton
delegates are apparent. Obama delegates dominate the Youth Caucus and the Black
Caucus, while Clinton delegates are more closely connected to the Women’s and LGBT
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered) Caucus. This graph suggests that
delegates’ positions in the party network vary in meaningful ways that translate into
opportunities and challenges for delegates.
Assessing Satisfaction and Support for Obama. A central question of this project
is what factors allow Obama to attract support from Clinton delegates? We answer this
question using regression analyses on Clinton delegates’ satisfaction with and support for
Obama. A satisfaction equation is estimated using an ordered probit model to account for
five levels of satisfaction, from one to five. The results of this estimation are reported in
Table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In assessing the individual’s position in the whole network, the coefficient on
Network Centrality is negative and significant. The marginal effect – calculated as the
probability of switching from somewhat to very satisfied – is 2.5 percent, implying that a
one unit increase in network centrality decreases the chances of being very satisfied with
Obama by 2.5 percent. This result supports the Overembeddedness Hypothesis (H2) at
the expense of the Social Capital Hypothesis (H1). Thus, Clinton delegates become less
receptive of Obama’s candidacy as they move closer to the center of the caucus network.
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The marginal effect of network centrality on satisfaction can be understood more
clearly by examining the predicted probabilities for each of the five categories, reported
in Figure 5. This graph is especially revealing of differences among the categories. The
effect of network centrality on satisfaction appears to be nonnegative, and possibly
positive, in moving from very unsatisfied to somewhat satisfied. The negative effect of
network centrality appears precisely in the move from somewhat to very satisfied. Thus,
the talk in the caucus network does not convert Obama lovers into adamant foes. Rather,
it turns potentially strong supporters into doubters. This result is consistent with the
effects gossip and character assassination identified in other networks (cf. Burt 2005).
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The composition of ego networks matter significantly in for the level of
satisfaction with Obama. The results in Table 2 demonstrate a positive and significant
effect of Obama Support Among Friends, consistent with the Cross-Cutting Networks
Hypothesis (H4), at the expense of the Social Capital Hypothesis (H3). The marginal
effect – calculated as the probability of switching from somewhat to very satisfied – is
7.4 percent, implying that a one-step increase in the Likert scale of friends’ political
preferences increases by 7.4 percent the chances of being very satisfied with Obama.
This result reveals that when Clinton delegates have ego networks rich in Obama
supporters, then they are likely to embrace the nominee. However, when they are flanked
mostly by other Clinton supporters or partisans of other candidates, their preexisting
views are reinforced and they refuse to allow the rift to heal.
The influence of close friends’ political views is illustrated in Figure 6. The
effect of friendship on Obama satisfaction is neutral or possibly negative in moving from
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very unsatisfied to somewhat satisfied. However, having friends who support Obama
dramatically enhances the probability of moving from somewhat to very satisfied. While
friends’ views are insufficient to persuade ardent opponents to become backers, they have
a good chance of turning lukewarm party regulars into enthusiasts for the candidate.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Networks are not the only factor that matters to healing the rift between Obama
and Clinton supporters. As anticipated, Experience with Party Institutions contributes
positively and significantly to the willingness of Clinton supporters to accept Obama.
Similarly, Support for Majority Rule – a characteristic of typical professionals rather than
amateurs within the party – has a positive, significant effect on satisfaction. Clinton’s
speech at the convention made no difference in her supporters’ willingness to embrace
Obama. Surprisingly, none of the demographic controls made a difference in Obama
satisfaction. At a minimum, we expected that Clinton supporters who are African
Americans would readily make the switch to Obama, while women would strenuously
resist doing so. However, any appearances of racial and gender disparities in support can
actually be accounted for using variables that measure networks, institutions, and views
on intra-party democracy.
The results in Table 2 convey the determinants of satisfaction with Obama among
Clinton delegates. An identical equation is estimated in Table 3 to uncover the
determinants of support for Obama. Satisfaction and support are conceptualized
differently, in that satisfaction may reflect passive acceptance – satisfaction with Obama
need not require one to act on this sentiment – whereas support implies that the
respondent intends to take affirmative actions – such as volunteering – on behalf of the
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candidate. Since the dependent variable is constructed by summing four Likert scales
(normalized to the [0,16] interval), it approximates a normal distribution, with truncation
at the lower bound of zero and the upper bound of 16. A tobit estimator is appropriate
under these conditions, recognizing both the approximate normal distribution of the data
and the two truncation points.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The results of tobit estimation on Obama support reported in Table 3
approximately mirror those presented for Obama satisfaction in Table 2. Network
Centrality exhibits a negative effect and Obama Support Among Friends yields a positive
effect. Experience with party institutions and Support for Majority Rule, help to heal the
rift, while Survey After Clinton Speech makes no difference. The only substantive
difference between the equations is that a higher Frequency of Religious Attendance
undermines active support for Obama, while it makes no difference in levels of
satisfaction.
The similarity of the results presented in Table 3 with those in Table 2 is quite
striking. Though the construction of the two dependent variables is conceptually distinct,
their correlation measures 0.76. The similarity of coefficients in their explanatory
equations, despite different estimation techniques and dependent variables, gives further
credence to the validity of the conclusions drawn here.
Assessing Clinton Delegates’ Convention Role. How to reintegrate Clinton
supporters into the new Obama-dominated Democratic Party is a second central question
of this research. Given the eight-year presidency of Bill Clinton, and the presumptivenominee status enjoyed by Hillary Clinton for some time, it is logical that Clinton’s
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supporters considered themselves the party “establishment” for most of the 1992-2008
period. Unlike the Republican Party, which has a tradition of vanquishing losing factions
from the party, the Democratic Party displays a culture of embracing the adherents of
losing candidates (Freeman 1986). Which are the factors that would allow the new guard
– dominated by Obama’s confidants – to accept the former rulers back into the party
fold?
The results of ordered probit analysis of Obama delegates’ answers to the threecategory indicator of acceptance are reported in Table 4. Unlike the findings from the
analyses of Clinton delegates, Obama delegates are not influenced significantly by social
networks in their acceptance of Clinton’s supporters. The nonsignificant coefficient on
Network Centrality lends support neither to the Social Capital Hypothesis (H1) nor the
Overembededness Hypothesis (H2). Similarly, the nonsignificant coefficient on Obama
Support Among Friends is consistent with – but not supportive of – the Social Capital
Hypothesis (H3), since it suggests that social ties are valuable regardless of their
composition. Nonetheless, this finding demands rejection of the Cross-Cutting Networks
Hypothesis in this case. Consistent with the findings reported in Tables 2 and 3,
Experience with Party Institutions contributes positively and significantly to healing the
rift.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Obama delegates who embrace Support for Majority Rule – rather than minority
rights – are less likely to see the role of Clinton’s supporters in a positive light. Although
this coefficient is negative – unlike the positive coefficient in equations for Obama
satisfaction and support – the logic is consistent. Obama supporters (who are in the
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majority) reject their role of the Clinton delegates when they adopt a majority-rule view,
but accept their role if they are sympathetic to minority rights. Clinton supporters (who
are in the minority) express dissatisfaction with and unwillingness to support Obama
when they adopt a minority-rights view, but accept the nominee if they have a sympathy
with a majority-rule posture. These findings underscore the continued relevance of the
Wilson’s (1962) distinction between party professionals (who rely on majority rule to
enforce essential party unity) and party amateurs (who may demand minority rights to
retain attachments to a losing candidate).
A major difference between the Obama satisfaction-support equations and the
Clinton delegates’-role equation pertains to the effect of Clinton’s convention speech.
The results in Table 4 reveal a significant, positive effect of Clinton’s speech on Obama’s
delegates’ willingness to accept the role Clinton’s supporters. The marginal effect
implies that Clinton’s endorsement of Obama increased by ten percent the probability
that an Obama delegate labels the role of Clinton delegates as “appropriate”, rather than
“too much.” It is striking that Clinton’s speech had a statistically discernable effect on
the attitudes of Obama’s delegates, but not on her own delegates. While further research
would be required to establish the sources of this difference, we speculate that an
explanation may be found in semi-public communications within the Clinton network.
To the extent that Clinton was able to sway her own supporters toward Obama, she may
have already achieved that effect in multiple, small convention venues, rather than in the
convention floor speech.
Robustness Analysis. The conclusions presented above were reached only after
careful consideration of how variations in the specification of statistical models could
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influence the results (Leamer 1978). First, the choice of statistical estimation methods
was evaluated as a source of bias. Ordered probit regressions were estimated instead as
ordered logits, yielding no difference in the pattern of statistically significant coefficients.
The tobit regression was re-estimated as an ordinary least squares model, producing
similar results. Second, the potential effects of sampling bias were considered. The
delegate sample collected differed from the population of delegates according to several
demographics, as reflected in the sampling analysis documented in Appendix B. To
evaluate the potential for sampling bias, weighted regressions were estimated to account
for population differences in race and sex identity. The weighted regressions did not
reveal any alteration in the pattern of statistically significant results obtained. Third, the
possibility that individual surveyors influenced the results by deviating from the sampling
design, or by prompting certain answers from the respondents, was evaluated. Equations
containing dummy variables for each interviewer did not uncover any significant
interviewer effects. The lack of an interviewer effect in this case, despite its
documentation in previous research (Schaeffer 1980), is most likely due to the penciland-pencil nature of the survey, which requires relatively minimal interaction between
the surveyor and the respondent. 6

Discussion
An implicitly functionalist bias inheres in much political analysis of social
networks. The positive externalities of networks – their efficiency in information
transmission and potential to circumvent the rigidities of formal organizations – make

6

These results are available from the authors upon request, but are not reported here due to space
constraints.
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them an appealing organizational form. Yet a considerable body of research points to a
dark side of networks; to their interference with information dissemination; to their
quelling of ideas. This research warns that networks may lead to undesirable effects for
the organizations that they inhabit. A party may benefit from networking across
decentralized institutions, but it may sometimes be paralyzed by this posture as well.
This study finds that network centrality within the party caucus network subverts,
at the margin, the Democratic Party’s success in healing the rifts of a contentious
nomination season. This finding must be placed in its proper context. It does not imply
that all party networks undermine the collective goals of a party. It does not mean that
convention caucuses uniformly hurt the Democratic Party. Rather, it reveals that, in
2008, caucus networks tended to perpetuate the old-guard Clinton establishment, rather
than opening the way to the party’s new leadership under Obama. Party networks have
considerable potential to undermine the party’s goals. This finding hints at paths toward
network reengineering. Perhaps the party could find ways to highlight the place of
currently informal caucuses (for health care or progressive policy) by subsidizing their
activities or granting parity with long-standing caucuses? Perhaps existing caucuses
linked to race and sex could be deemphasized? Greater emphasis could be placed on
enhancing the expertise communicated through caucus networks, thus muting their
potentially demobilizing effects (McClurg 2006).
While we would not venture to suggest that the Democrats should abandon their
long-standing caucus tradition, the evidence in this paper validates the Republicans’
reluctance to adopt this approach themselves. Caucuses enliven the democratic nature of
a party, but also stimulate resistance to center-down mandates. Especially in the
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comparatively hierarchical culture in the Republican Party, a caucus-style organization
would cut against the grain.
Beyond the pressures of caucus networks on party politics, this study points to the
relevance of ego networks in interpreting partisan attitudes and behavior. To a large
extent, the findings reported here demonstrate the implications of the cross-cutting
network perspective of Mutz (2006) for political parties. The question arises, however,
as to whether respondents’ estimates of their friends’ political affiliations are reliable
indicators of their friends’ actual political views? As was the case in Finifter’s (1974)
study of Detroit-area auto workers, political minorities may attempt to hide their
proclivities from their discussion partners, or may avoid political discussions entirely
with those with whom they disagree.
We think that the biases of friendship misperception or selection are minimal in
the current study. First, even if respondents do deceive themselves about the political
views of their discussion partners, the perception of network composition may be more
important theoretically than the actual composition of the network (Huckfeldt, Mendez,
and Osborn 2004). If respondents believe that their network has a certain political
composition, that belief may have a greater influence on behavior than the true, but
hidden, preferences of their friends. Second, the ego network question in the present
study focuses on “close” friends, who are naturally more intimate that the co-workers
analyzed in Finifter’s work. Third, people choose friendships on many bases other than
politics – even if politics are a consideration. Fourth, the relatively short-term nature of
the dispute between Obama and Clinton was probably too short-lived to determine many
long-term friendships. If preferences between the major parties are usually a limited
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factor influencing friendship choice, then a factional dispute between two Democrats is
unlikely to reconfigure a person’s basic friendship structure. These considerations imply
that feedback between friendship choice and political attitudes is small relative to the
broader imperative of this relationship.
Finally, what is to be made of the difference in network effect for Clinton
delegates – who are significantly influenced by their access to networks – and Obama
delegates who are not? It may be that networks are critical to determining the basic
assessment of the nominee and decisions to allocate resources and effort to him – as the
Clinton delegates were forced to undertake – but less than essential to establishing views
about various factions in the party – as was the case for the Obama delegates. That is, the
status of Clinton delegates within the party may not have been important enough to
activate extensive discussion networks on this question among Obama delegates.

Conclusion
This research is not about whether or not the Democrats healed the rift in their
party in 2008, but about the mechanisms which enabled them, or prevented them from
doing so. The evidence presented here reveals that party networks may play as or more
important a role in perpetuating the rift as they do in healing it. The overembeddess and
cross-cutting networks views of networks are supported empirically here, though a strict
social-capital perspective is not. These findings suggest a more complex role for social
networks within parties than has been envisioned previously within this domain.
Network effects depend on network structure (Siegel 2009) and composition (Huckfeldt,
Mendez and Osborn 2004). Healing the rift caused by a divisive nomination contest may

25

require parties to turn strategically – rather than blindly and bluntly – to informal
networks.
This research identifies an arena in which networks matter to party performance
beyond ostensible links to interest groups, social movements, 527 organizations, financial
donors, and legislators. It illuminates the operation of networks among activists, who
must ultimately lead the party’s efforts at the local level in fundraising, candidate
selection, and grassroots organizing. More research is needed to deconstruct the evolving
relevance of these networks to activists. How do party activists’ networks change over
time with the emergence of new technologies, such as Blackberries and Facebook? What
are the divergent forces – educational institutions, social movements, critical elections –
that shape the structure of these networks? What is the nature and extent of differences
between the major parties in activists’ networks? To what extent are significant minor
parties, such as the Libertarian Party and the Green Party, integrated informally into the
major parties through networks? Systematic investigation of these questions would likely
portend a social turn in the study of parties and stimulate greater integration of this
research tradition with allied communities that probe the behavior of interest groups,
social movements, and activism generally.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Obama and Clinton Delegates
Obama Delegates

Dependent Variables
Satisfaction with Obama
Support for Obama
Role of Clinton Supporters
Focal Independent Variables
Network Centrality
Obama Support Among Friends
Experience with Party Institutions
Support for Majority Rule
Survey After Clinton Speech
Control Variables
African American
Female
LGBT Identity
Age in Years
Ideology (liberal to conservative)
Educational Attainment
Personal Income
From Union Household
Frequency of Religious Attendance

Clinton Delegates

Difference
of Means

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

P-value

225
217
218

4.960
14.323
1.817

0.196
2.392
0.493

4
3
1

5
16
3

214
200
215

4.000
10.345
2.209

1.241
5.152
0.545

1
0
1

5
16
3

0.000
0.000
0.000

227
221
227
227
227

4.312
4.068
1.604
0.749
0.330

4.302
0.939
0.913
0.435
0.471

0
1
0
0
0

13.579
5
4
1
1

222
205
222
222
222

4.640
2.902
1.777
0.599
0.396

4.644
1.138
0.976
0.491
0.490

0
1
0
0
0

13.724
5
4
1
1

0.438
0.000
0.053
0.001
0.147

209
210
205
205
214
203
199
207
207

0.215
0.443
0.132
45.361
2.949
4.685
4.578
0.295
3.193

0.412
0.498
0.339
15.178
1.388
1.338
2.232
0.457
1.485

0
0
0
18
1
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
79
6
6
9
1
5

203
205
197
199
200
202
192
199
198

0.099
0.551
0.203
47.420
3.120
4.535
4.766
0.432
3.020

0.299
0.499
0.403
16.178
1.391
1.411
2.065
0.497
1.463

0
0
0
18
1
2
1
0
1

1
1
1
87
6
6
9
1
5

0.001
0.027
0.055
0.188
0.211
0.273
0.389
0.004
0.239

Notes: Significant p-values are in bold.
All tabulations performed on original data (imputations not used).

Table 2. Satisfaction with Obama by Clinton Delegates: Ordered Probit Analysis
Dependent Variable
Satisfaction with Obama
Focal Independent Variables
Network Centrality
Obama Support Among Friends
Experience with Party Institutions
Support for Majority Rule
Survey After Clinton Speech
Control Variables
African American
Female
LGBT Identity
Age in Years
Ideology (liberal to conservative)
Educational Attainment
Personal Income
From Union Household
Frequency of Religious Attendance
Cut Points
First Cut Point
Second Cut Point
Third Cut Point
Fourth Cut Point
Overall Regression Statistics
N = 214
Log likelihood = -257.346
LR χ2(14)=53.250, p=0.000

Marginal
Effect

Coeff.

Std.
Err.

P-Value

-0.025
0.074
0.096
0.247
0.063

-0.062
0.185
0.241
0.637
0.158

0.022
0.077
0.092
0.167
0.168

0.004
0.016
0.008
0.000
0.346

0.155
0.045
0.015
-0.001
-0.043
0.021
-0.022
0.143
-0.045

0.391
0.114
0.038
-0.001
-0.108
0.054
-0.055
0.359
-0.113

0.320
0.197
0.228
0.006
0.067
0.065
0.043
0.184
0.062

0.221
0.564
0.869
0.816
0.106
0.411
0.208
0.051
0.067

-1.104
-0.542
-0.136
0.738

0.613
0.605
0.604
0.606

Notes: Significant p-values are in bold.
Marginal effects are calculated as the probability of switching from a satisfaction
level of 4 to a satisfaction of 5 due to a one unit change in the independent
variable, holding all other variables at their means.
Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.

Table 3. Support for Obama by Clinton Delegates: Tobit Analysis
Coeff.
Focal Independent Variables
-0.371
Network Centrality
0.961
Obama Support Among Friends
2.054
Experience with Party Institutions
2.366
Support for Majority Rule
-0.417
Survey After Clinton Speech
Control Variables
0.753
African American
0.562
Female
0.410
LGBT Identity
0.060
Age in Years
-0.096
Ideology (liberal to conservative)
0.329
Educational Attainment
-0.056
Personal Income
0.569
From Union Household
-0.823
Frequency of Religious Attendance
3.123
Constant
Overall Regression Statistics
Log Likelihood = -495.853
N=200
Left-Censored Observations (Y≤0) = 17
Uncensored Observations (0≤Y<16) = 132
Right-Censored Observations (Y≥16) = 51
LR χ2(14) = 48.960, p = 0.000
σ = 6.36, Std. Err. of σ = 0.428

Std.
Err.

P-Value

0.129
0.459
0.543
1.001
1.018

0.005
0.038
0.000
0.019
0.682

1.868
1.179
1.349
0.034
0.384
0.393
0.256
1.084
0.361
3.487

0.687
0.634
0.762
0.080
0.804
0.405
0.827
0.600
0.024
0.372

Notes: Significant p-values are in bold.
Marginal effects are identical to the coefficient in the Tobit model.
Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.

Table 4. Acceptance of Role of Clinton Supporters among Obama Delegates:
Ordered Probit Analysis
Dependent Variable:
Acceptance of Role of Clinton
Supporters
Focal Independent Variables
Network Centrality
Obama Support Among Friends
Experience with Party Institutions
Support for Majority Rule
Survey After Clinton Speech
Control Variables
African American
Female
LGBT Identity
Age in Years
Ideology (liberal to conservative)
Educational Attainment
Personal Income
From Union Household
Frequency of Religious Attendance
Cut Points
First Cut Point
Second Cut Point
Overall Regression Statistics
N = 218
Log likelihood = -138.341
LR χ2(14)= 33.920, p=0.002

Marginal
Effect

Coeff.

Std.
Err.

-0.005
0.024
0.062
-0.085
0.100

-0.022
0.110
0.287
-0.524
0.568

0.024
0.102
0.110
0.220
0.200

0.358
0.279
0.009
0.017
0.005

-0.017
-0.099
-0.052
-0.001
-0.020
-0.006
0.015
0.048
0.021

-0.081
-0.463
-0.244
-0.005
-0.091
-0.029
0.070
0.223
0.098

0.248
0.204
0.285
0.007
0.070
0.084
0.053
0.208
0.067

0.744
0.023
0.393
0.469
0.193
0.732
0.183
0.284
0.143

-0.498
2.262

0.635
0.664

P-Value

Notes: Significant p-values are in bold.
Marginal effects are calculated as the probability of switching from an acceptance
level of 1 to an acceptance level of 2 due to a one unit change in the independent
variable, holding all other variables at their means.
Missing values imputed using complete case imputation.
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Figure 2. Histogram of Support for Obama by Candidate Pledged
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Figure 3. Histogram of Acceptance of Role of Clinton Supporters
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Figure 4. Caucus Network at 2008 Democratic National Convention
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Notes: This figure is produced using a two-mode network of delegates’ participation in
caucuses at the 2008 Democratic National Convention. The figure is generated in UCINET
6.59 / NetDraw 2.046 with the spring-embedding algorithm to determine nodal position.
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Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of Clinton Delegates’ Satisfaction
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Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities of Clinton Delegates’ Satisfaction
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Appendix A. Survey Questions Used in Data Analysis
The following questions were used in the data analysis performed herein. Questions are
listed according to their original numbers in the survey. Questions not used in the data
analysis have been omitted from the list but are available from the authors upon request.
2. Are you officially pledged to a particular candidate, or are you unaffiliated? Please
circle one. [Pledged, Unaffiliated] If pledged, to which candidate?
3. Are you a member of any of the party’s standing committees (rules & bylaws,
credentials, platform, etc.)? [Yes, No]
4. Are you participating in any of the caucuses being held by the party at this convention?
[Yes, No] If yes, which ones?
5. Have you ever been an officer in a state or local political party (including county party
chair, treasurer, precinct captain, etc.)? [Yes, No]
6. Have you ever attended a Democratic National Convention in an official capacity in
the past? [Yes, No]
11. How satisfied are you with Barack Obama as the presidential nominee of the
Democratic Party? Please circle one. [Very Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied, Neither
Satisfied nor Dissatisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied, Very Dissatisfied]
13. What do you think about the role played by Hillary Clinton’s supporters during this
convention? Please circle one. [Clinton’s supporters have played too much of a role,
Clinton’s supporters have been involved appropriately, Clinton’s supporters have not
played enough of a role]
19. In your opinion, should all decisions at the convention be determined by a simple
majority of delegates, or should losing candidates’ supporters be given special
consideration? Please circle one. [All decisions should be made by majority rule,
Losing candidates’ supporters should be given special consideration for some decisions,
Don’t know]
25. How would you describe the political preferences of your close friends during the
primaries and caucuses? Please circle one. [Almost all of my close friends supported
Obama, Most of my close friends supported Obama, My close friends were split about
evenly between Obama and other candidates, Most of my close friends supported
candidates other than Obama, Almost all of my close friends supported candidates other
than Obama]
26. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: Please circle one. [To the “left” of
strong liberal, A Strong Liberal, A Not very strong Liberal, A Moderate who leans
Liberal, A Moderate, A Moderate who leans Conservative, A Not Very Strong

Conservative, A Strong Conservative, To the “right” of strong conservative, Other
(please specify)]
30. How likely is it that you will volunteer your time to support Obama’s campaign
between now and election day? [Extremely likely, Very Likely, Somewhat Likely, Not
too Likely, Not at all Likely]
31. How likely is it that you will give money to support Obama’s campaign between now
and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]
32. How likely is it that you will help raise money for Obama’s campaign between now
and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]
33. How likely is it that you will try to persuade others to vote for Obama between now
and election day? [Extremely Likely to Not at all Likely (same as above)]
36. How often do you attend religious services? Please circle one. [Every week, Almost
every week, Once or twice a month, A few times a year, Never]
38. What is your sex/gender?
39. How old are you? [________ years]
40. What is your race/ethnicity? Circle as many as apply: [Native
American/American-Indian, White / Caucasian, Black / African American, Latino /
Hispanic, Asian / Asian American / Pacific Islander, Other ]
41. Do you think of yourself as: Please circle one. [Straight / heterosexual, Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Other (please specify), Prefer not to say]
43. Do you or anyone in your household belong to a labor union? [Yes, No]
45. Could you please tell us the highest level of formal education you have completed?
Circle only one. [Less than high school diploma, High School diploma, Some college /
Associate’s or technical degree, College degree, Some graduate education, Graduate or
professional degree]
46. Could you please tell us your level of annual income in 2007? Please circle only
one. [less than $15,000, $15,001 - $25,000, $25,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to $75,000,
$75,001 to $100,000, $100,001 to $125,000, $125,001 to $150,000, $150,001 to
$350,000, More than $350,000]
Please note that the date of the interview and the identity of the surveyor were recorded
administratively.

Appendix B. Democratic National Convention Pledged Delegates Sample
Sampling Category
Race / Ethnicty
African American
Asian American
Caucasian
Latino / Hispanic
Native American
Sex / Gender Identity
Female
LGBT
Pledged Status
Clinton Delegates
Obama Delegates

Our Sample

Population of
Delegates

15.80%
4.10%
59.80%
13.60%
6.10%

24.50%
4.60%
56.70%
11.80%
2.50%

49.60%
16.70%

50.10%
5.80%

49.44%
50.06%

48.94%
51.06%

Notes: Overall survey response rate = 72%
Data on the population of delegates were obtained from Democratic
National Committee (2008).

